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WORKING WELL(NESS): THE IMPACT OF THE ADA FINAL RULE 
ON WELLNESS PROGRAM REGULATION AND A PROPOSAL FOR 
A ZERO-INCENTIVE RULE 
ABSTRACT 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) recently amended 
wellness program regulation under 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14 of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). Amidst criticism of the new rule, this article proposes 
the EEOC return to a zero-incentive policy for voluntary wellness programs that 
include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations. First, it reviews 
existing literature on wellness programs and the ADA, highlighting the legal 
and ethical challenges facing American workers with disabilities. Then, it 
explores the latest case law, illustrating the effects of the new rule compared to 
the proposal. By eliminating the thirty percent incentive limit and redefining 
“voluntary” to disallow all financial incentives and penalties, the EEOC would 
best realize the ADA’s goal to protect workers from harmful cost shifting and 
from being compelled to give employers disability-related information that 
could lead to workplace discrimination. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In May 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) 
issued a final rule, which took effect January 2017, regulating employee 
wellness programs under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).1 
The rule responds to conflicting legal and policy regulations regarding wellness 
programs.2 The final rule reflects the EEOC’s intention to harmonize ADA 
regulations with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) and the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).3 The rule 
defines “voluntary wellness programs,” identifies permissible incentives, and 
provides interpretive guidance for structuring non-discriminatory wellness 
programs.4 Yet its attempt to resolve some regulative issues has sparked new 
issues of contention among wellness program proponents and critics alike.  
In this paper, I propose the EEOC return to a zero-incentive policy for 
voluntary wellness programs that includes disability-related inquiries or medical 
examinations. I argue that despite their popularity, wellness programs have not 
produced results warranting abridgment of longstanding ADA protections, nor 
should those protections be sacrificed for the supposed benefit of other laws, 
including the politically jeopardized ACA. The ADA stands on its own, and its 
rules should be in the best interests of its own legislative aims.  
Section II contextualizes wellness programs by summarizing recent trends 
among programs in the United States. Section II also considers the known merits 
of wellness programs and the relationship between the legal and policy goals of 
promoting wellness programs. Section II continues with an introduction to the 
existing literature on the interaction between wellness programs and the ADA—
discussing ongoing ethical and legal conflicts, including the clash between the 
narrative of personal responsibility and the reality of disability discrimination in 
the workplace. This section also examines comments the EEOC received on the 
proposed final rule in its preliminary stages. Turning to litigation, I direct the 
reader to several key cases illustrating the development of judicial interpretation 
of how wellness programs function under the ADA, focusing primarily on the 
definition of “voluntary” and the insurance safe harbor provision in EEOC v. 
Flambeau, Inc. and EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.  
Section III discusses recent litigation to illustrate the ways in which the final 
rule does and does not address previously identified concerns about the legal 
 
 1. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,126 (May 
17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 2. Id. 
 3. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, EEOC Issues Final Rules on Employer 
Wellness Programs (May 16, 2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/5-16-16.cfm 
(last visited July 31, 2017). 
 4. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) (2016). 
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conflicts between wellness program promotion and the ADA, analyzing the 
repercussions of both the final rule and the proposed zero-incentive rule in 
Flambeau, Orion, and AARP v. EEOC. The final rule has injected a new legal 
problem for voluntariness under the ADA on which courts have yet to reach 
consensus, though these cases show that courts are giving deference to the 
EEOC’s compromise-driven explanation for the digression from its previous 
interpretation. The recommendation put forth in this paper is for the EEOC to 
amend 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) by removing the thirty percent incentive 
limit and redefining “voluntary” health programs involving disability-related 
inquiries or medical examinations as programs in which an employer may 
neither require participation nor penalize employees who do not participate. A 
zero-incentive rule best encapsulates the legislative intent to protect workers 
from discrimination based on disability. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
A. A Brief Introduction to Wellness Programs 
Wellness programs are a booming industry among large employers, and 
today most programs are tied to employer-sponsored health insurance plans.5 
Employers offer a wide range of wellness programs—from gift card raffles for 
weight loss and incentives for wearing FitBits to smoking cessation programs 
and reduced insurance premiums.6 The two main types of programs are 
participatory and health-contingent, the latter of which requires employees to hit 
certain health benchmarks to earn rewards (or accrue penalties if benchmarks 
are not reached).7 Both programs, but particularly health-contingent programs, 
may require employees to divulge medical information by completing health 
risk assessments (HRAs)—for which employees answer questions about their 
health, including “medical history, health status, and lifestyle”—as well as 
undergoing biometric screenings—for which employees are examined by a 
health care professional and data is collected from blood work and other medical 
 
 5. See Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health Promotion: The Role of 
Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 299–300 
(2012). 
 6. KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH, RESEARCH & EDU. TR., Employer Health Benefits 
Survey 2016 Summary of Findings 8 (2016), https://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/ 
2016/09/employer-health-benefits-2016-summary-of-findings.pdf [hereinafter KFF & HRET] 
(presenting data for employer-sponsored health benefits in 2016 as collected by the Kaiser Family 
Foundation and the Health Research & Educational Trust in their annual survey of employer-
sponsored health benefits among private and nonfederal public employers with three or more 
workers). 
 7. Emily Koruda, Note, More Carrot, Less Stick: Workplace Wellness Programs & the 
Discriminatory Impact of Financial and Health-Based Incentives, 36 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 131, 
138 (2016). 
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tests on their risk factors, such as “body weight, cholesterol, blood pressure, 
stress, and nutrition.”8 This data is then used to evaluate a given employee’s 
health risks.9 Among employers offering some form of a wellness program in 
2016, over half of large firms (employing 200 or more workers) incorporate 
HRAs and biometric screenings.10 Because large firms comprise over half of 
U.S. employment, the programs selected by those firms may affect large 
numbers of workers.11 Once the data is obtained, employees may have to meet 
certain health benchmarks—such as quitting smoking or improving cholesterol 
levels—as part of their participation in the wellness program.12  
The number of wellness programs in the United States has risen dramatically 
in the twenty-first century.13 While wellness programs are making headlines, 
such as with the proliferation of wearable fitness trackers,14 the 2016 Kaiser 
Family Foundation’s (KFF’s) eighteenth annual Employer Health Benefits 
Survey indicates the upward trend may be ebbing.15 Since 1979, the federal 
government has encouraged employers to promote wellness at work.16 By the 
late 1990s, approximately half of employees reported being offered wellness 
programs.17 Jumping forward with the KFF annual survey, the number of large 
employers offering wellness programs surged to eighty-two percent in 2008 and 
peaked at ninety-nine percent in 2013.18 The spike in the number of wellness 
programs was “likely due to expectations that they would improve employee 
health and productivity and reduce health care costs.”19 Indeed, employers 
generally implement wellness programs for two broad purposes: (1) cost savings 
 
 8. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7. 
 9. Kristin Madison, Employer Wellness Incentives, the ACA, and the ADA: Reconciling 
Policy Objectives, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 407, 413 (2015). 
 10. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7 ex. J. 
 11. Madison, supra note 9, at 413. 
 12. Koruda, supra note 7, at 138–39. 
 13. E. Pierce Blue, Wellness Programs, the ADA, and GINA: Framing the Conflict, 31 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 367, 369 (2014). 
 14. FITBIT, FitBit Group Health, www.fitbit.com/group-health (last visited July 9, 2017). 
 15. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 7 (reporting that eighty-three percent of large employers 
in 2016 offered at least one wellness program); KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & 
TR., Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey 2014 200 ex. 12.2 (2014), https://kaiserfamily 
foundation.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/8625-employer-health-benefits-2014-annual-survey6.pdf 
[hereinafter KFF & HRET, Survey 2014] (reporting that ninety-eight percent of large employers in 
2014 offered at least one wellness program); KAISER FAM. FOUND. & HEALTH RESEARCH & TR., 
Employer Health Benefits Annual Survey 2013 184 ex. 12.2 (2013), files.kff.org/attachment/full-
report-ehbs-2013-abstract [hereinafter KFF & HRET, Survey 2013] (reporting that ninety-nine 
percent of large employers in 2013 offered at least one wellness program). 
 16. Madison, supra note 9, at 412. 
 17. Blue, supra note 13, at 370. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Haijing Huang et al., Incentives, Program Configuration, and Employee Uptake of 
Workplace Wellness Programs, 58 J. OCCUPATIONAL & ENV. MED. 30, 30 (2016). 
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and (2) improved employee health.20 The rationale for focusing on employee 
health is to reduce health care insurance costs for the employer as well as reduce 
employee absenteeism and increase productivity.21 The saturated market for 
wellness programs in 2013 tapered off slightly to ninety-eight percent in 2014, 
and the most recent 2016 data reports only eighty-three percent of large 
employers have wellness programs.22 Wellness programs are certainly not going 
to disappear in the next decade, but it is possible that unsuccessful cost saving—
both in research studies and in practice—has contributed to the slight decline in 
the last two years. 
B. The Effectiveness of Wellness Programs at Saving Money and Improving 
Health 
In order to recommend a rule that would make certain wellness programs 
unlawful, it is useful to consider the existing research on the effectiveness of 
such programs on the two goals mentioned above: saving money and improving 
health. If a policy of bargaining away core protections of the ADA is to be 
supportable, then wellness programs’ cost savings and health improvement 
ought to be measurable and provable. While the industry marketers of wellness 
programs promise results,23 there is a lack of credible scholarship on wellness 
program performance—and those studies performed do not find that wellness 
programs are having the desired impact on either of the two goals of cost savings 
or health improvement.24  
One problem with measuring savings from wellness programs is the manner 
in which premiums are counted.25 Insurance companies continue to charge 
higher and higher premiums, and, as a result, employers adopt health plans that 
cost-shift to employees.26 For wellness programs tied to insurance plans, an 
employer may think it has achieved overall cost savings when its own premium 
costs to the insurance company are reduced; often, however, the insurance 
company actually raises the total premiums and cost-shifts the difference to the 
employees.27 Other ways an employer may misperceive total savings when 
adopting a wellness program are by reducing benefits or increasing deductibles, 
both of which allow the employer to reduce its out-of-pocket premium costs to 
 
 20. Mariner, supra note 5, at 300. 
 21. Id. 
 22. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 8; KFF & HRET, Survey 2014, supra note 15, at 200 ex. 
12.2; KFF & HRET, Survey 2013, supra note 15, at 184 ex. 12.2. 
 23. Madison, supra note 9, at 413. 
 24. E. Pierce Blue, Attorney-Advisor to EEOC Commissioner Chai Feldblum, Invited Speaker 
at Saint Louis University School of Law: Employee Wellness Plans and the ADA: How Does the 
ADA Apply? (Oct. 25, 2016) (on file with Saint Louis University School of Law). 
 25. Mariner, supra note 5, at 309. 
 26. Koruda, supra note 7, at 139. 
 27. Madison, supra note 9, at 414. 
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the detriment of the employee.28 The main issue is that the employer pays less 
in premiums than it did before the wellness program, the employees who 
participate in the program may pay the same as before or slightly less depending 
on the incentive, and the insurance company receives higher premiums. Such a 
scenario is not a reduction in total health care costs, which is what wellness 
programs are often marketed to accomplish and which skirts close to the kind of 
program the EEOC specifically denounces in § 1630.14(d)(1): to meet the 
requirement of “reasonably designed,” a wellness program must have “a 
reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in 
participating employees,” and “[a] program also is not reasonably designed if it 
exists mainly to shift costs from the covered entity to targeted employees based 
on their health.”29 Wellness program leaders tell employers that wellness 
programs bring savings—both to the employer and to the employees.30 Despite 
numerous “examples in the literature of companies that say they saved money 
in wellness . . . the results are never plausibility-tested.”31 Moreover, the ones 
most burdened are those employees who do not want to share their health 
information and thus opt out of the wellness programs, ultimately paying large 
financial penalties. Individuals with disabilities or chronic illnesses, “who are 
more vulnerable to health disparities . . . [and are] already wracked with medical 
expenses, can feel coerced to participate in wellness programs . . . [and] are less 
able to attain employer-designated health benchmarks because of inherent health 
disparities.”32 
A 2015 Research and Development (RAND) Corporation study about 
employee uptake in wellness programs contributed to the growing body of 
research showing a lack of cost savings achieved by wellness programs.33 Such 
studies are important background for legal policy decisions, especially given that 
“the heated debate is carried out with little empirical evidence on whether 
incentives are actually effective in increasing employee participation, let alone 
 
 28. See id.; see also Barry Hall, Health Incentives: The Science and Art of Motivating Healthy 
Behaviors, BENEFITS Q., 2nd Quarter 2008, at 20–21 (rationalizing the disparate cost shifting by 
conceiving of health promotion itself as the employees’ quantifiable gain). 
 29. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(1) (2016). 
 30. Madison, supra note 9, at 413. 
 31. AL LEWIS, WHY NOBODY BELIEVES THE NUMBERS: DISTINGUISHING FACT FROM 
FICTION IN POPULATION HEALTH MANAGEMENT 128 (2012). 
 32. Koruda, supra note 7, at 139. 
 33. Kandice A. Kapinos et al., Does Targeting Higher Health Risk Employees or Increasing 
Intervention Intensity Yield Savings in a Workplace Wellness Program? 57 J. OCCUPATIONAL & 
ENV. MED. 1257, 1261 (2015) (finding that data from a preventive-oriented wellness program 
collected between 2003 and 2011 showed no cost savings for those employees targeted for chronic 
risks while active lifestyle management participation showed a modest twenty dollar savings based 
on less expensive outpatient visits). 
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improving health outcomes and reducing cost.”34 The 2015 employee uptake 
study involved employers seeking to increase employee participation rates in 
wellness programs, which is highly relevant to the EEOC’s argument that 
wellness programs can only be effective if they actually acquire all the 
employees’ data.35 Scholars note that “[e]mployers appear to be more 
enthusiastic about health promotion than employees.”36 Without the employees 
incentivized to provide their data, the programs cannot accurately target areas in 
need of risk management among the pool of employees.37 Thus, it is not 
surprising that increased financial incentives showed a twenty-three percent 
increase in employee participation in the wellness program.38  
When measuring the success of a wellness program, researchers should look 
beyond economic and health indicators: “Successful implementation can be 
difficult and should be weighed against the actual return on investment, 
considered along with not only the legal costs but also the potential effects for 
discrimination.”39 That is, even if a wellness program provably cuts costs and 
improves health, it would still be undesirable if it results in potential 
discrimination.40 It is not an acceptable trade to exchange protections against 
discrimination with monetary gains and “wellness,” a term that the next section 
explains carries normative connotations in the context of discrimination on the 
basis of a disability. 
C. The History of Wellness Programs and the ADA: Identifying Ethical and 
Legal Conflicts 
The ADA regulates employers’ access to employee medical information in 
order to protect workers from being discriminated against on the basis of a 
disability.41 The ADA limits the extent to which employers may use incentives 
to encourage employees to participate in wellness programs that ask them to 
respond to disability-related inquiries or undergo medical examinations: 
 
 34. Huang, supra note 19, at 30. 
 35. Blue, supra note 13, at 382. 
 36. Mariner, supra note 5, at 300. 
 37. Blue, supra note 13, at 382. 
 38. Huang, supra note 19, at 33. 
 39. Carrie Griffin Basas, What’s Bad About Wellness? What the Disability Rights Perspective 
Offers About the Limitations of Wellness, 39 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 1035, 1045 (2014). 
 40. See SOEREN MATTKE ET AL., WORKPLACE WELLNESS PROGRAMS STUDY: FINAL REPORT 
98 (2013) (explaining that “[a]dditionally, reasonable accommodations for persons with disabilities 
(e.g., offering classes at accessible, ADA-compliant sites and providing informational material in 
plain language and alternate formats, such as large print) are important to ensure accessibility; 
however, case study employers did not discuss tailoring wellness programs to the needs of people 
with disabilities”). 
 41. Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a), (d)(1) (2012); Blue, supra note 
13, at 374. 
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A covered entity shall not require a medical examination and shall not make 
medical inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an individual 
with a disability or as to the nature or severity of the disability, unless such 
examination or inquiry is shown to be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.42 
The ADA permits three exceptions to when an employer can acquire medical 
information from its employees: (1) when inquiries are job-related and 
consistent with business necessity, (2) when inquiries pertain to the employee’s 
ability to perform job-related functions, and (3) when inquiries are a voluntary 
component of an employer-sponsored wellness program.43 Thus, wellness 
programs are expressly provided for by the ADA. However, the legal definition 
of “voluntary” under the ADA has become extremely contentious in its new 
form in the final rule.44  
Another key aspect of wellness programs covered by the ADA is reasonable 
accommodation. If a person with a disability cannot participate in an activity or 
attain a certain benchmark, the program must offer an alternate activity or 
standard the individual is able to meet.45 For example, if a wellness program 
offers a reward for walking a certain amount, an individual who cannot walk 
must be given the opportunity to do an alternate fitness activity; similarly, if a 
wellness program penalizes employees who fail to achieve a goal of a specific 
low cholesterol level, and an individual is unable to do so due to a chronic 
medical condition or other disability, then some alternative goal must be set that 
is reasonably tailored to that individual’s needs.46 “Reasonable alternative 
standards do not need to be anticipated or crafted in advance; they can be created 
as the need arises, taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the 
employee’s limitations and the ‘reasonable design’ of the program itself.”47 The 
legislative intent is “to ensure equal access to benefits.”48  
The entitlement to reasonable accommodation under the ADA is challenging 
in the arena of wellness programs, where health is framed as a personal 
responsibility with financial consequences for failure to meet certain norms in 
the workplace. The very idea that wellness is attainable through quantitative 
biometrics or pure autonomous effort “construct[s] an image that further 
marginalizes people with disabilities.”49 Courts also tend to define wellness 
under the same framework of personal and economic responsibility “based on a 
theory that ‘encouraging employees to get involved in their own healthcare leads 
 
 42. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A). 
 43. Blue, supra note 13, at 376. 
 44. See id. 
 45. Id. at 377; 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(5)(A). 
 46. Blue, supra note 13, at 377. 
 47. Basas, supra note 39, at 1042 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. Blue, supra note 13, at 377. 
 49. Basas, supra note 39, at 1062. 
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to a more healthy population that costs less to insure.’”50 From an ethical 
standpoint, scholars—including Wendy Mariner, Carrie Griffin Basas, and Peter 
Conrad—have cautioned against viewing health status as a personal failing for 
which to be financially and socially penalized.51 Rather, it has been espoused 
that “[d]isability rights recognizes that some people will, in fact, never be 
healthy or vigorous and that the best efforts are spent not on trying to change the 
impossible but in removing the social and economic barriers that stigmatize 
illness.”52 Mariner commented that “[d]iscrimination on the basis of health 
factors may be as irrational as discrimination on the basis of disability.”53 There 
is a fear that introducing risk classification to employee wellness can harm 
Americans with disabilities by creating a social norm of health such that any 
deviancy is an individual failing.54 This notion “reflect[s] increasing levels of 
deservedness for health or illness…fram[ing] disability as the problem or the 
undesirable difference, rather than see[ing] it as a neutral state of being,”55 which 
can lead to discrimination. Furthermore, framing health as a personal 
responsibility is incorporated into the ACA, “which is inconsistent with [the 
ACA’s] overall goal of universal access to health care.”56 If the ACA aimed to 
remove classifications such that everyone could get access to health care, it is 
contradictory to simultaneously invite employers to pay and penalize employees 
based on health risk classifications.57 In this way, support of corporate 
participatory wellness programs by the Tri-Agency—comprised of the 
departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and Treasury—is 
“incompatible with” the ADA, which banned employers from requiring 
employees to provide health information before wellness programs were 
adopted into the statutory language as an exception.58 Wellness program 
promotion thus “reinforces the pre-ADA fear that employees with disabilities 
place ever-expanding burdens on the budget because of accommodation and 
health care costs.”59  
 
 50. Id. at 1038 (quoting Seff v. Broward Cty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1374 (S.D. Fla. 2011), 
aff’d sub nom. Seff v. Broward Cty., Fla., 691 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2012)). 
 51. Mariner, supra note 5, at 330–31; Basas, supra note 39, at 1054–55; Peter Conrad, 
Wellness in the Work Place: Potentials and Pitfalls of Work-Site Health Promotion, 65 MILBANK 
Q. 255, 267–68 (1987). 
 52. Basas, supra note 39, at 1054. 
 53. Mariner, supra note 5, at 324. 
 54. See id. 
 55. Basas, supra note 39, at 1051 (emphasis added). 
 56. Mariner, supra note 5, at 330. 
 57. See id. at 328. 
 58. Jennifer Pomeranz, Participatory Workplace Wellness Programs: Reward, Penalty, and 
Regulatory Conflict, 93 MILBANK Q. 301, 302–03 (2015) (arguing pre-final rule that new federal 
law is needed to protect the ADA). 
 59. Basas, supra note 39, at 1057. 
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D. Comments to the EEOC’s Proposed Final Rule 
Shifting from a review of the scholarly literature to recent organization-
based approaches, the EEOC received over 300 comments to its proposed rule 
on the government regulations website and 2750 comments overall from a wide 
range of organizations and individuals: some offering support and others raising 
concerns.60 The Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities (CCD) and the 
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund (DREDF) criticized the proposed 
rule for not placing sufficient limits on wellness program medical inquiries to 
protect workers with disabilities.61 The proposed rule adopted a version of the 
thirty percent financial penalty limit found in HIPAA and the ACA.62 As an 
alternative to limiting insurance premium penalties, the CCD and DREDF 
suggested waiving penalties as reasonable accommodation under the ADA.63 
Rather than financially penalizing individuals with disabilities who opt not to 
complete HRAs or biometric screenings, the EEOC would direct employers to 
waive the penalty so workers with disabilities would not be denied equal 
opportunities for incentives.  
The EEOC’s allowance for penalties also led the CCD and DREDF to 
disagree with the EEOC’s definition of “voluntary.”64 For fifteen years prior to 
the proposed rule, the EEOC defined “voluntary” under the ADA “to mean that 
an employer may neither require participation nor penalize employees who do 
not participate.”65 The transition to permitting penalties for non-participation 
was the EEOC’s concession to the penalty limits in the ACA. The CCD and 
DREDF urge that the ADA and the ACA may coexist and that the ADA does 
not need to loosen protections for workers with disabilities by “importing” ACA 
penalties.66 Rather, the EEOC should retain the original “voluntary” 
 
 60. Regulations under the Americans with Disabilities Act; Amendments, REGULATIONS.GOV 
(Jun. 19, 2015), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0001 (last visited 
July 9, 2017); Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,129 
(proposed May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 61. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, Comments on Proposed Rule, Amendments to 
Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, RIN 3046-AB01 1 (June 19, 2015), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0303 (last visited July 9, 2017); 
Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Comments on Proposed Rule, Amendments to 
Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, RIN 3046–AB01 18 (June 19, 2016), 
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=EEOC-2015-0006-0318 (last visited July 9, 2017). 
 62. Amendments to Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 
21,659, 21,662 (proposed Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 63. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 16; Disability Rights 
Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 18. 
 64. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 3–4; Disability Rights 
Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 3. 
 65. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 3–4. 
 66. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 9; Disability Rights Education 
& Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 7–8. 
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interpretation in which non-job-related medical examinations and inquiries 
cannot require participation or impose penalties for non-participation.67 The 
CCD and DREDF argue the proposed rule’s definition of “voluntary” presents 
a “Hobson’s choice” in which workers seeking to protect themselves under the 
ADA must choose between burdensome financial penalties and relinquishing “a 
core protection of the ADA” to be free from disability-related medical inquiries 
in the workplace.68 If the penalties are too high, the choice becomes coercive 
and effectively not a choice. Considering the numbers in perspective, the KFF 
2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey found the average annual individual 
insurance premium was $6435, and thirty percent of that is over $1900 in 
potential penalties each year for not completing a required HRA or biometric 
screening.69 The CCD notes there is essentially a double penalty because in 
addition to the thousands of dollars in penalties a worker may owe, the same 
worker would also be denied savings from employer contributions, which are as 
high as twenty to thirty percent of the costs for workers participating in the 
wellness program as part of the employer benefits plan for eighty-five percent 
of employers.70 This shifts a non-nominal burden onto those who need the most 
financial assistance: low-income workers with disabilities. Indeed, the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions reports that in 2014 
American workers with disabilities comprised a large percentage of workers in 
poverty.71 The principal author of the 2013 federal government RAND study on 
employer wellness programs wrote, “We should not penalize vulnerable 
employees reluctant to join marginally effective programs.”72 Thus, while it is 
laudable for the EEOC to aim for a system of rewards and penalties large enough 
to incentivize but not so large as to render employer-provided health plans 
unaffordable, the CCD and DREDF calculate the proposed rule would not serve 
that goal, because it would result in penalties and lost incentives to those least 
able to shoulder the burden.73 A fairer system, the organizations argue, would 
be (1) to prohibit financial penalties and (2) to ensure financial incentives are 
offered to all workers regardless of whether they provide answers to medical 
 
 67. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 11–12. 
 68. Id. at 4, 12; Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 3, 10. 
 69. KFF & HRET, supra note 6, at 1–2 (noting workers on average contribute eighteen percent 
of the premium for single coverage). 
 70. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 5. 
 71. S. COMM. ON HEALTH, EDUC., LABOR & PENSIONS, 113TH CONG., FULFILLING THE 
PROMISE: OVERCOMING THE PERSISTENT BARRIERS TO ECON. SELF-SUFFICIENCY FOR PEOPLE 
WITH DISABILITIES 2 (2014); see also BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF 
COMMERCE, INCOME & POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 13 tbl. 3, 16 (2016), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf 
(finding in 2014 that over four million people with disabilities were in poverty, comprising 17.9% 
of all people in poverty between the ages of eighteen and sixty-four). 
 72. Consortium for Citizens with Disabilities, supra note 61, at 15–16. 
 73. See id. at 16; Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 2. 
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inquiries.74 In this way, workers with disabilities would not be denied incentives 
because of their disabilities.  
In sum, wellness programs are not leaving the workplace just yet. There is 
bipartisan support for wellness programs: the personal responsibility for one’s 
health appeals to conservative policies,75 while the focus on preventive health 
models for the American worker appeals to liberal policies. Yet studies show 
that the cost savings and health benefits are not as viable as advertised by 
wellness plan promoters.76 Shuffled money and disguised cost shifting leave 
vulnerable employees with disabilities unable to opt out and thus bearing the 
greatest cost when they are the least likely to benefit from the health metric 
requirements.  
E. EEOC Litigation on the Safe Harbor Provision 
Turning from public comments to the judicial arena, courts have interpreted 
wellness program compliance with the ADA in a way that is inconsistent with 
the final rule. To set the stage, the EEOC has litigated ADA and wellness 
program conflicts once in the Eleventh Circuit and twice in the Seventh Circuit 
with mixed results.77 The conflicts arose with respect to whether the insurance 
safe harbor provision of 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) applies to employer wellness 
programs.78 Although “[w]ellness programs are not traditionally associated with 
basic risk underwriting,” employers have nonetheless argued the insurance safe 
harbor provision insulates their programs that are tied to health insurance plans 
from discrimination claims.79 The original reasoning for having a safe harbor 
was “to allow premium differences that are based on actuarial differences in 
claims costs,” rather than on “some independent desire for a healthy 
workforce.”80 In the final rule, the EEOC asserts the safe harbor provision does 
not apply to wellness programs.81 Before the final rule was issued, the courts 
 
 74. Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, supra note 61, at 11–12. 
 75. See A Better Way: Our Vision for a Confident America, OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER OF THE 
HOUSE 2, abetterway.speaker.gov/_assets/pdf/ABetterWay-HealthCare-Snapshot.pdf (“Rather 
than tie up wellness programs in red tape, our plan makes sure employers are able to reward 
employees for making healthy choices. This will encourage personal responsibility, and save both 
businesses and workers valuable health care dollars.”). 
 76. Kapinos, supra note 33, at 1261. 
 77. Seff v. Broward Cty., 691 F.3d 1221, 1221 (11th Cir. 2012); EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 
F.3d 941, 941 (7th Cir. 2017); EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 989 (E.D. 
Wis. 2016). 
 78. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1222; Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d at 944; Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. 
Supp. 3d at 992. 
 79. Blue, supra note 13, at 379. 
 80. Mariner, supra note 5, at 319–20. 
 81. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (2016) (“The ‘safe harbor’ provisions in § 1630.16(f) 
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held otherwise in Seff v. Broward County and on summary judgment in EEOC 
v. Flambeau, Inc.82 
In Flambeau, the district court held that requiring participation in a wellness 
plan was a condition precedent for being on the employer insurance plan, and 
that this constituted a “term” of the insurance plan; hence the safe harbor rule 
applied.83 In that case, the employer’s wellness program required an HRA and 
biometric screening as well as other health promotion activities like weight loss 
competitions and healthy vending machines.84 The EEOC argued that 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12112(d)(4)(A) prohibited a covered entity from requiring a medical 
examination unless shown to be job-related and consistent with business 
necessity.85 The EEOC also argued that applying the insurance safe harbor to 
employer wellness plans would render its rules for wellness programs 
ineffective.86 The court, however, held the safe harbor applied because use of 
the HRA results to make decisions “fundamental . . . [to] developing and 
administering an insurance plan,” comprised a “term” under the benefit plan.87 
The court believed this would not render the EEOC rule ineffective because not 
all wellness programs are tied to insurance plans.88 This district court case was 
decided before the EEOC issued its final rule. 
In the wake of the unfavorable rulings in Seff and Flambeau, the EEOC took 
a strong stance on the inapplicability of the safe harbor provision to wellness 
programs in the interpretive guidance section of the final rule.89 Overly 
expansive applications of the provision, the EEOC cautioned, would justify any 
medical inquiry posed to a worker as part of a health plan “if there is some 
possibility—real or theoretical—that the information might be used to reduce 
risks.”90 Alluding to possible reduced health risks in wellness programs is “one 
step removed” from insurance underwriting, which involves actuarial models 
and setting premiums based on calculations of health risk.91 The EEOC 
 
of this part applicable to health insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not apply to 
wellness programs, even if such plans are part of a covered entity’s health plan.”). 
 82. Seff, 691 F.3d at 1222; Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d at 944; Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. 
Supp. 3d at 992. 
 83. EEOC v. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 855 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941, 
941 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 84. Id. at 852. 
 85. Id. at 853. 
 86. Id. at 853–54. 
 87. Id. at 856. 
 88. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d at 856. 
 89. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,126, 31,131 
(proposed May 17, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Blue, supra note 13, at 379. 
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considered itself free to clarify its interpretive guidance on the issue because 
neither Seff nor Flambeau held the statutory language ambiguous.92  
The next court battleground was in the Seventh Circuit and was the first case 
on the ADA and wellness programs to be decided at the district level after the 
EEOC issued the final rule. In September 2016, summary judgment was denied 
to an employer seeking to shield its wellness program from the ADA under the 
safe harbor provision in EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc.93 The court’s 
rationale, however, was not wholly aligned with that of the EEOC. Thus, 
questions remain regarding future litigation on the issue. In the case, the 
voluntary wellness program presented the worker with the choice to undergo the 
HRA and have the employer fully cover her premium, or to not undergo the 
HRA and pay 100% of her premium.94 In contrast to the criticism of this kind of 
“voluntary” wellness program by the CCD and DREDF in their comments to the 
proposed rule, the court held this choice to be voluntary—even if it was “a hard 
choice.”95 The court nonetheless applied the EEOC’s clarification in the final 
rule regarding the inapplicability of the safe harbor provision.96 The court 
provided the rationale that because the health plan was available separately from 
the wellness program, it was not a term of that plan.97 The plan was available 
whether or not the worker opted out of the HRA, albeit at full cost.98 Therefore, 
the court reasoned the wellness program was not used in such a way that the 
insurance safe harbor would apply.99 Notably, the court did not set its ruling 
contrary to the decision in Flambeau.100 The court distinguished Orion from 
Flambeau, where the wellness program was a condition precedent for the worker 
to be on the employer insurance plan.101 By distinguishing rather than ruling 
differently based on the EEOC’s newly issued final rule, the court left the door 
open to future legal disagreement on insurance plan terms and the applicability 
of the insurance safe harbor to employer wellness plans. 
III.  ANALYSIS 
A. Proposal for a Zero-Incentive Rule 
The previous section provided a background of research, public 
commentary, and judicial perspectives on wellness programs and ADA 
 
 92. Regulations Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,131. 
 93. EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 992 (E.D. Wis. 2016). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1001. 
 96. Id. at 997. 
 97. Id. at 999. 
 98. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d at 999. 
 99. Id. at 1000. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. at 999. 
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compliance. This section recommends the EEOC amend its definition of 
“voluntary” in 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) to implement a zero-incentive rule 
for wellness programs that require disability-related inquiries or medical 
examinations. For those types of wellness programs, under this rule, the EEOC 
should remove the problematic thirty percent incentive limit in favor of 
disallowing any financial incentives or penalties. This straightforward approach 
recaptures the EEOC’s well-defined, pre-final rule policy on what constitutes a 
“voluntary” program, does not produce significantly inconsistent results with the 
ACA and HIPAA for the vast majority of programs, and demonstrates the 
agency’s accountability to the ADA’s goal of protecting individuals from 
discrimination on the basis of disability. 
B. Application of the Final Rule and Proposed Zero-Incentive Rule in 
Litigation 
Even before adopting the thirty percent limit, the EEOC has pursued 
litigation of employer wellness programs having incentives or penalties 
significantly higher than thirty percent, such as complete coverage or denial of 
coverage. In 2014, however, the Chicago EEOC office departed from that trend 
by filing a case against an employer for a program that presented a closer 
issue.102 In that case, EEOC v. Honeywell International Inc., the employer’s 
wellness program offered employees a participatory incentive of a $1500 
employer contribution to employees’ health savings accounts as well as imposed 
non-participatory penalties of $500 and $1000 for health plan and tobacco 
surcharges, respectively.103 The Chicago EEOC argued that Honeywell’s 
incentives and penalties were too large for the wellness program to be considered 
voluntary under the ADA.104 Although the local EEOC offices independently 
pursue litigation matters, the EEOC as a whole received a great deal of attention 
for the Honeywell suit, much of it negative from employers, and pressure was 
placed on the EEOC to clarify its position on incentive-based wellness 
programs.105 The Honeywell court likewise noted, “Recent lawsuits filed by the 
EEOC highlight the tension between the ACA and the ADA and signal the 
necessity for clarity in the law so that corporations are able to design lawful 
wellness programs and also to ensure that employees are aware of their rights 
under the law.”106 
 
 102. Madison, supra note 9, at 428. 
 103. Id. 
 104. EEOC v. Honeywell Int’l Inc., Civil No. 14-4517 ADM/TNL, 2014 WL 5795481, at *5 
(D. Minn. 2014). 
 105. Blue, supra note 24. 
 106. Honeywell Int’l Inc., 2014 WL 5795481, at *5. 
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1. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc. 
Applying the EEOC final rule to the facts in EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., where 
participation in the wellness program was required in order to be on the 
employer’s health plan and the incentive was as high as seventy-five percent,107 
the district court case was wrongly decided. Flambeau’s wellness program did 
not meet either the old or revised criteria for voluntary wellness programs to 
qualify as an exception to the ADA’s prohibition against a covered entity from 
requiring a medical examination unless shown to be job-related and consistent 
with “business necessity” under § 102(d)(4)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).108 
Under the final rule, the program cannot be voluntary if participation is 
required in order to be on the employer’s health plan.109 When required for 
enrollment, a wellness program cannot be considered voluntary “even if 
[employees] could get [a health plan] elsewhere,” such as in the federal health 
care Marketplace.110 In this case, employees were required to complete an HRA 
and biometric screenings in order to enroll in the employer’s health plan.111 
Therefore, the wellness program was a condition precedent for the employee to 
be on the employer’s insurance plan.112 Because the court wrongly applied the 
safe harbor provision, the court did not analyze whether the HRA and biometric 
testing were “actually ‘required’ in the manner prohibited by § 
12112(d)(4)(A).”113 The facts, however, showed that enrollment in the 
employer’s health plan was denied to employees who did not participate in the 
wellness program; the plan of the employee, in this case, was in fact canceled 
when he was unable to complete the HRA and biometric screenings demanded 
by the wellness program.114 The employee could only reinstate coverage through 
The Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (COBRA), paying the 
entire premium cost and more.115 This suggests the plain meaning of “required” 
applies when failure to meet the requirement results in the employee being 
dropped from the employer’s health plan. Furthermore, the clarification in the 
 
 107. Complaint at 1, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 
3d 849 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (No. 3:14-cv-00638), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(2)(ii) (2016) (a voluntary program “[d]oes not deny 
coverage under any of its group health plans or particular benefits packages within a group health 
plan for non-participation”). 
 110. Oral Argument at 12:08, EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941 (7th Cir. 2016) (No. 16-
1402), www.courtlistener.com/audio/24860/eeoc-v-flambeau-incorporated/ (last visited July 10, 
2017). 
 111. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 852 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 941 
(7th Cir. 2017). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 851. 
 114. Complaint, supra note 107, at 4. 
 115. Id. 
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final rule about the definition of “voluntary” bolsters this interpretation for why 
the wellness program violated § 102(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. 
The financial incentive and penalty structure of Flambeau’s wellness 
program was not voluntary under the final rule. Under the final rule, employers 
may not set incentives or penalties exceeding thirty percent of self-only coverage 
for wellness program participation.116 As an incentive, Flambeau offered to pay 
seventy-five percent of an employee’s health insurance premium in exchange 
for participation in the wellness program, which had mandatory HRAs and 
biometric screenings.117 Thus, the EEOC explained, “If [the employee] had been 
able to complete Flambeau’s so-called ‘voluntary’ biometric testing and health 
risk assessment, Flambeau would have covered roughly three fourths of [his] 
health insurance premiums.”118 Because seventy-five percent exceeds the thirty-
percent limit, the program would not be voluntary under the final rule. The 
EEOC further argued that an employee resorting to paying full premiums 
through COBRA as a direct result of failing to complete the wellness program 
requirements constituted a penalty.119 Arguably, even if the incentive had been 
thirty percent, the program structure would still not have satisfied the final rule 
because it imposed a penalty of 100% of the total cost of self-only coverage, 
given that the final rule specifically applies to incentives “whether in the form 
of a reward or penalty,”120 since those are really “two sides of the same coin.”121 
An acceptable penalty under the final rule, hypothetically, may have been asking 
employees not participating in the wellness program to pay up to seventy percent 
of their premiums, which on the flipside provides a thirty percent incentive to 
those choosing to participate in the wellness program. On the other hand, that 
would still depend on allowing employees to enroll at a higher price rather than 
denying them enrollment in the plan at all, as was the case here where the 
employee turned to COBRA to cover the gap in coverage. During oral argument 
in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, EEOC attorney Anne Noel Occhialino 
explained, taking into account the final rule, “I don’t think that this case raises 
. . . [the issue of] whether that thirty percent limit is permissible or not 
permissible, because Flambeau’s wellness plan flunks the voluntary test even 
 
 116. Regulations to Implement the Equal Employment Provisions of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3)(i) (2016) (“The use of incentives . . . whether in the 
form of a reward or penalty . . . [may] not exceed [t]hirty percent of the total cost of self-only 
coverage . . . .”). 
 117. Complaint, supra note 107, at 4. 
 118. Id. 
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 120. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(3); Michelle R. Seares, Note, Wellness at Work: Reconciling the 
Affordable Care Act with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 218, 236–
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without that.”122 Putting together Flambeau’s wellness program’s seventy-five 
percent incentive, 100% penalty, and involuntary participation requirement for 
plan enrollment, its wellness program violated the ADA under the final rule. 
Likewise, under the proposed zero-incentive rule, the wellness program was 
not voluntary because it offered a seventy-five percent incentive. Under the 
particular facts of this case, even if the incentive was revised to the final rule 
limit of thirty percent, there would be no conflict between the outcomes of the 
final rule and the zero-incentive rule. Flambeau’s wellness program was a 
condition precedent for accessing the employer-sponsored health plan, which 
rendered it involuntary under both the final rule and the zero-incentive rule. 
Applying the final rule, the insurance safe harbor provision did not apply to 
Flambeau’s wellness program such that it would be permitted to violate § 
102(d)(4)(A) of the ADA. The final rule explicitly states that the safe harbor 
provision does not apply to wellness programs, even those that are tied to a 
health plan.123 While the district court applied the safe harbor provision, noting 
the final rule had not yet been issued,124 at oral argument on appeal, the EEOC 
referred to the recently promulgated final rule and asserted Flambeau was not 
“engaging in underwriting risk, classifying risk, or administering risk[;]” 
therefore the wellness program was not a valid application of the safe harbor 
provision.125 Giving deference to the unambiguous language of the ADA and 
the EEOC’s final rule, a court should not apply the safe harbor provision to 
Flambeau’s wellness program. 
The Seventh Circuit did not ultimately reach the merits of the appeal on 
whether the program was voluntary or whether the safe harbor applied, because 
jurisdictional standing problems were raised during oral argument with respect 
to the wellness program being discontinued and the potential lack of damages 
given that the employee regained coverage.126 Although Judge David Hamilton 
described the case as “much ado about ancient history,”127 the EEOC argued 
that, absent a declaratory judgment, Flambeau could reinstitute the wellness 
program.128 The court rejected this argument, finding Flambeau had 
discontinued the mandatory biometric testing and HRA for its wellness program 
 
 122. Oral Argument, supra note 110, at 10:40. 
 123. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.14(d)(6) (“The ‘safe harbor’ provisions in § 1630.16(f) of this part 
applicable to health insurance, life insurance, and other benefit plans do not apply to wellness 
programs, even if such plans are part of a covered entity’s health plan.”). 
 124. EEOC v. Flambeau Inc., 131 F. Supp. 3d 849, 854, 856 (W.D. Wis. 2015), aff’d, 846 F.3d 
941, 941 (7th Cir. 2017). 
 125. Oral Argument, supra note 110, at 13:16. 
 126. Id. at 4:22–5:07. 
 127. Id. at 6:09. 
 128. EEOC v. Flambeau, Inc., 846 F.3d 941, 949 (7th Cir. 2017) (arguing that the “voluntary 
cessation exception to mootness” should apply). 
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because it was not cost effective, a rationale outside the lawsuit, rendering the 
EEOC’s claim for injunctive relief moot.129  
Although jurisdictional issues stymied this case, losing the chance to set a 
judicial precedent for the EEOC’s wellness program guidelines, an important 
lesson nonetheless emerges from the fact that the employer ultimately 
terminated the wellness program. Other employers can take heed of the facts of 
this case and the EEOC’s concerns for designing better, ADA-compliant 
programs. 
2. EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, Inc. 
A review under the final rule would reverse the holding that the wellness 
program was “voluntary” under the ADA in EEOC v. Orion Energy Systems, 
Inc.130 The Seventh Circuit decision from September 2016 denied summary 
judgment to an employer, ruling favorably for the EEOC that the safe harbor 
provision did not apply but ruling favorably for the employer on the issue of 
whether the program was “voluntary” under § 12112(d)(4)(B).131 In Orion’s 
wellness program, Orion provided an incentive of 100% coverage of 
participating employees’ premiums, while “[e]mployees who declined to 
participate were required to pay their entire premium cost and were charged an 
additional $50 per month for failure to complete a fitness component of the 
company’s wellness program.”132 The employee in the case who did not 
participate in the wellness program paid the full premium of $413.43 per month 
plus a penalty of $50 per month, totaling to $463.43 per month.133 The potential 
penalties were threefold, with the third being an $80 penalty for smoking.134 
Thus, an employee opting out of the wellness program “exercising her right to 
be free from disability-related medical inquiries and examinations”135 could 
potentially be responsible for $5561.16 annually in health plan costs compared 
to an opt-in employee paying $0 for the same coverage. Even though the two 
add-on penalties of $130 per month almost make the threshold cut of thirty 
percent ($124 per month of the $413.43 monthly premium), the combination of 
the penalties with the choice between zero employee contribution and complete 
employee contribution does not satisfy the EEOC’s definition of voluntary. As 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. EEOC v. Orion Energy Sys., Inc., 208 F. Supp. 3d 989, 995 (E.D. Wis. 2016). 
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in Flambeau and Honeywell, such “aggressive programs”136 exceeding the thirty 
percent incentive limits are outside the scope of “voluntary” in the final rule.137  
Under the proposed zero-incentive rule, just as for the final rule, the 100% 
incentive would make the wellness program in Orion involuntary and therefore 
impermissible. Even if the incentive was reduced to the thirty percent limit 
allowed for in the final rule, the additional financial penalties—$50 per month 
for failure to perform the fitness component and $80 per month for failure to quit 
smoking—would violate the zero-incentive rule.  
Furthermore, even if the monthly penalties were reduced to $124 per month 
(that is, thirty percent of the monthly premium of $413.43), an employee who 
chose not to participate would still potentially owe $1488 in penalties annually. 
For the facts in Orion, an annual penalty of $1488 would be permissible under 
the final rule because it does not exceed the limit of thirty percent of the total 
cost of self-only coverage. Contrastingly, under the proposed zero-incentive 
rule, an employer would not be able to charge an employee $1488 annually for 
declining to participate in a “voluntary” program requiring a medical 
examination and disability-related inquiries.  
Whether such an amount in financial penalties is sufficiently burdensome as 
to justify calling a program involuntary has been questioned. For example, 
Madison considered the effect of a hypothetical $500 reward on employees who 
were asked to weigh the costs and benefits of participating in a program 
requiring disability-related inquiries and medical examinations.138 She posited 
that it was unlikely $500 would blind employees to potential risks.139 Madison 
concluded that neither the ACA regulation of thirty percent incentive limits nor 
a prohibition on incentives was a perfect fit, and instead she “stake[d] out a 
middle ground . . . [for] how to implement an incentive ceiling that would help 
to ensure . . . voluntariness.”140 However, the least ambiguous way to ensure that 
a financial incentive does not cause workers to subject themselves to potential 
discrimination is through a zero-incentive rule. One problem with trying to 
articulate a permissible incentive limit—aside from the fundamental 
disagreement over whether any incentive should be permitted—is that health 
insurance costs are not stagnant. As health insurance costs continue to rise—
when considering not just premiums but increasingly high deductibles, without 
equitable gains in income—the amount of money represented by thirty percent 
of self-only coverage becomes larger and larger, thus becoming more and more 
burdensome. According to the KFF 2016 Employer Health Benefits Survey, 
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workers earnings increased 2.5%, inflation increased 1.1%, and self-only 
premium costs showed no significant increase; however, deductibles ballooned 
for workers, increasing 12% since 2015 and nearly 50% since 2011.141 As KFF 
President and Chief Executive Officer Drew Altman explained, the lower 
premiums reflect a tradeoff in rapidly rising deductible costs.142 Given that 
deductibles continue to rise without matched gains in income, the dollar amount 
represented by a thirty percent incentive ceiling tied solely to premiums is an 
unreliable figure on which to base legislative policy. Perhaps thirty percent is 
reasonable this year,143 but its reasonableness is less certain in five years, ten 
years, and beyond. A zero-incentive policy offers a solution that leaves no room 
for ambiguity when it comes to evaluating at what point an employee’s choice 
becomes involuntary due to financial incentives or penalties. Moreover, like the 
final rule, the proposed zero-incentive rule is not a blanket prohibition against 
all financial incentives tied to wellness programs. Rather, like the final rule, it 
carves out a subset of programs—namely, those wellness programs that require 
disability-related inquiries or medical examinations.144 This advantage of the 
zero-incentive rule compared to the thirty percent rule is further expanded on in 
the next section. 
3. AARP v. EEOC 
When evaluating the performance of the final rule at harmonizing the 
regulatory scheme and balancing the policy agendas of different individuals and 
national organizations, the fact that the EEOC was sued over the final rule speaks 
simply and sharply to its shortfalls. Three months before the final rule was to 
take effect, AARP sought a preliminary injunction and filed a complaint against 
the EEOC challenging the reworked definition of “voluntary.”145 While the 
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court found AARP would be unlikely to succeed on the merits to strike down 
the final rule as unlawful,146 the case demonstrates the high level of 
dissatisfaction with the EEOC’s adjustments to the ADA protections for 
Americans with disabilities. The case “raises important questions about the 
complex interaction of the ADA, GINA, the ACA and HIPAA that implicate the 
public interest on all sides.”147  
AARP claimed that “permitting employers to penalize employees up to 30% 
of premiums for refusing to submit to medical inquiries and examinations is 
arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and contrary to law.”148 AARP 
specified the final rule is “unlawful because it is not a reasonable construction 
of the statutory term in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4).”149 The case is informative 
because it concretizes the specific harms anticipated by AARP members. AARP 
said its members would face increased premiums that they would be unable to 
afford, and they would be “forced to disclose confidential medical information 
that they would not otherwise choose to disclose.”150 In holding that AARP had 
standing to bring suit on the ADA claim, the court ruled that an increase in 
premiums would constitute injury.151 Furthermore, the court agreed that the 
increase was sufficiently certain to occur because employers can and do push 
the limits, thus incentives would almost certainly be raised to the thirty percent 
because that is the new permissible maximum.152 The court did not grant the 
preliminary injunction, however, because it concluded that the harms of 
increased premiums and disclosure of medical information were not irreparable 
harms resulting from the ADA final rule.153 The court was “sympathetic to the 
fact that these new rules implicate important privacy interests” and agreed 
“disclosure of confidential information in the first instance could still constitute 
irreparable harm,” but reasoned that the aggregated data reporting protections in 
the final rule adequately “guard against the discrimination the plaintiff fears” at 
least to the point of making harm from disclosure fall short of warranting a 
preliminary injunction.154 
Although challenging the final rule’s legality made a strong statement 
against the EEOC, it was unsurprising that the court determined AARP was not 
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likely to succeed on the merits—albeit on a limited record.155 The court 
acknowledged that at this early stage it lacked access to the full administrative 
record and predicted further judicial analysis would be needed at later stages in 
the litigation.156 The court denied the preliminary injunction AARP brought on 
both its claims: (1) that the final rule’s interpretation of “voluntary” as permitting 
incentives is coercive and unlawful and (2) that the EEOC did not make the final 
rule through “reasoned decision-making.”157 On the first claim, the court echoed 
the Orion court’s language that “a hard choice is not the same as no choice,” 
which again should not be the legal conclusion under the final rule.158 The court 
hinged part of its decision on a very narrow point, however, attending to the fact 
that AARP challenged the specific thirty percent incentive level rather than any 
level of incentive,159 leaving it open whether AARP would consider a five 
percent or fifteen percent incentive just as coercive as thirty percent. The court 
reasoned that determining the precise level of permissible incentives “is exactly 
the kind of agency determination to which the Court owes some deference.”160 
After all, as the court points out, the EEOC purposely chose thirty percent with 
the goal of harmonizing the ADA with the ACA.161 The court, therefore, 
concluded that the EEOC is free to define “voluntary” however it wants, given 
that it was undefined in the original statute.162  
More palatable is the court’s holding on the second claim regarding whether 
AARP adequately explained its decision to change the “voluntary” guidelines. 
The court found that the “EEOC recognized that it was changing its position . . . 
but concluded that permitting the use of certain incentives . . . is ‘the best way’ 
to promote the ADA’s and GINA’s goal of preventing employment 
discrimination while at the same time effectuating the purpose of the wellness 
provisions.”163 The explanation may exist, but whether the explanation is 
satisfying is another matter. AARP’s judicial challenge puts a spotlight on the 
final rule and previews potential future legal battles that will be fought against 
the EEOC’s perceived shift from a maximum to a modicum of protections under 
the ADA. 
Turning to the proposed zero-incentive rule, a weakness in AARP’s 
argument that is not shared by the zero-incentive approach is the ineffectiveness 
of arguing against a specific limit rather than arguing against all incentives.164 
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The court explained that setting levels of incentives is “exactly” the type of 
agency decision to which a court gives deference,165 leaving open the possibility 
that framing the EEOC’s final rule criteria for “voluntary” as fundamentally 
wrong, rather than as a poorly chosen level, would be more likely to succeed in 
meeting the arbitrary and capricious standard. Regarding that deference to 
agency decisions, however, the court may have given the EEOC too much 
deference given its justification for the change being a compromise to create 
harmony with HIPAA and the ACA.166 
Specifically, while deliberate joint-agency coordination may warrant 
judicial deference “as a signal to courts about how important an agency regards 
the issue, giving judges some confidence that decision makers have closely 
examined the evidence and relevant statutory factors,”167 the thirty percent 
incentive limit for voluntariness in the final rule was not necessarily the result 
of a deliberate process of coordination among multiple agencies but rather a 
single agency yielding to other agencies.168 An “extensive” and “unified” effort 
between agencies that “reflects a careful consideration of multiple agency 
perspectives,” may be due deference for “a policy choice that harmonizes 
potential inconsistencies.”169 However, that deference should not 
incontrovertibly extend here where a unilateral decision for a thirty percent 
incentive was acceded to by the EEOC, without the EEOC necessarily 
conducting its own rigorous analysis within the framework of the ADA. AARP 
alleged in its complaint that “[t]he EEOC did not base the 30% penalty/incentive 
limit on any facts in the record, any economic analysis, or any other legal 
requirement.”170 The court acknowledged its decision was the product of an 
incomplete record, yet nonetheless deemed the EEOC’s compromise 
explanation as “reasoned decision-making.”171 Merely adopting another 
agency’s decision—one which reverses its previous policy—should not be 
sufficient to survive a challenge under the arbitrary and capricious standard. 
Indeed, “the mere achievement of consensus among agencies should [not] 
substitute for other evidence of a decision’s reasonableness and the agencies’ 
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thoroughness in considering relevant information.”172 The AARP court did 
qualify its determination by noting there remained an open statutory question 
that depended on a review of the full record.173  
If the EEOC, on the other hand, adopted a zero-incentive rule, reaffirming 
an existing policy approach to voluntariness based on a record of research 
showing its reasonableness as a means to maintain longstanding ADA 
protections, then that rule would likely be more easily upheld as reasoned 
decision making given the research presented here. Additionally, the EEOC 
would not be sued by AARP or the many other organizations that expressed 
dissatisfaction with the thirty percent limit in the final rule. 
The EEOC’s explanation has further weaknesses, which support undoing the 
change to the thirty percent incentive rule in favor of adopting a zero-incentive 
rule. These include compatibility with HIPAA and the ACA, as well as KFF 
survey data pointing towards early resolution of remaining harmony issues. As 
DREDF aptly explained, the wellness programs that require disability-related or 
medical examinations comprise only a subset of wellness programs regulated by 
HIPAA and the ACA, and thus may be regulated under the ADA in ways that 
are not reflected in the other laws.174 A wellness program can comply with all 
three laws by complying with the incentive limits for the specific programs to 
which they apply. Moreover, the KFF 2016 survey demonstrated a decline in the 
number of wellness programs most likely to fall within the purview of the 
proposed zero-incentive rule.175 One explanation for the decline provided by the 
studies on the effectiveness of wellness programs described in Section II may be 
the failure of wellness programs to fulfill the promises of the twin goals of cost 
savings and improved employee health.176 For example, the Flambeau court 
deemed the case moot when the employer said it ended the required medical 
examination aspect of the program not because it was sued by the EEOC but 
rather because it simply was not cost effective.177 Therefore, one possibility is 
that the very programs that may produce some inconsistencies between a zero-
incentive rule and the thirty percent limits of the ACA and HIPAA may be 
phased out over time, thereby resolving the issue without the need to 
compromise ADA protections to conform with the Tri-Agencies’ thirty percent 
incentive limits. 
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IV.  CONCLUSIONS 
Wellness programs, since their inception, have posed legal and policy 
challenges to American workers with disabilities, and the ADA final rule does 
not alleviate the pressure towards achieving “wellness” and does not maintain a 
core protection previously upheld by the ADA—the protection against being 
compelled to give employers disability-related information that could lead to 
workplace discrimination. The cases discussed here were used as laboratories 
for understanding the final rule and the proposed zero-incentive rule, and they 
lay the groundwork for future courts to continue to wrestle with the changing 
health care regulatory scheme as it pertains to wellness programs. If the number 
of wellness programs have truly seen their heyday and are on the decline, as 
suggested by the KFF survey, then perhaps the studies showing a lack of 
effectiveness or cost savings are leading to less of the aggressive wellness 
programs that the EEOC has spent time litigating. Based on the types of cases 
the EEOC has pursued thus far, excluding the Chicago office’s Honeywell case, 
the EEOC will likely continue to litigate cases with egregiously high incentives 
and penalties, particularly programs (where they still exist) at 100% or zero 
contribution for wellness program participation. Meanwhile, there will be 
challenges brought against the EEOC, as with AARP, concerning privacy and 
coercion. Further issues unexplored in this paper include aspects of those privacy 
concerns covered by the concurrently-issued final rule for GINA.178  
This paper recommends a zero-incentive rule for voluntary wellness 
programs that include disability-related inquiries or medical examinations, 
replacing the thirty percent incentive limit described in § 1630.14(d)(2)–(3) of 
the final rule. By preventing employers from using financial incentives or 
penalties to elicit participation in voluntary wellness programs, the EEOC would 
set a clear, factually-supported standard for wellness programs to comply with 
the ADA’s goal to shield employees from disability-based discrimination. Such 
a rule would not only preserve the integrity of the EEOC’s past policy position 
but also set up workers for a future in which rising health care costs could not 
be cost-shifted through wellness program incentives or penalties to workers who 
would be the least benefited and most burdened. 
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